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VALUING COMPANION ANIMALS:
ALTERNATIVES TO MARKET VALUE
This article explores how the lives of companion animals – pets by another 
name – are valued in negligence actions when they are wrongfully killed, and 
the justifications underlying the current approach of market value.  Because 
Canadians welcome companion animals into their families for reasons that go 
beyond economics, this paper argues that a proposition of law that values them 
based only on market value fails accurately to identify and compensate for the 
loss suffered when a companion animal is wrongfully killed.
Compensating a plaintiff for either mental distress or loss of companionship 
appears, initially, to be an attractive alternative to the market value approach; 
however, because of the cautious manner with which psychological injuries 
have been approached in Canada, and the common law position that loss of 
companionship is non-compensable, these alternatives are impracticable means 
by which the present legal position could be modified. While compensation for 
mental distress can respond to some situations involving the wrongful death of 
a pet, it cannot provide redress in all such actions. 
A solution to the challenges posed by the present legal position lies in valuation 
by reference to the investment made by animal guardians during the course 
of a companion animal’s lifetime. This method would allow for a companion 
animal’s value to be accurately measured, thereby permitting compensation that 
adequately reflects the entirety of the loss suffered. Legislative change, creating a 
statutory cause of action for the attendant non-pecuniary loss, would be the most 
effective way of achieving this proposed change.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Canadians live in a society where companion animals are increasingly 
elevated to the status of family members. Animal guardians willingly 
expend large sums of money feeding and caring for their companion 
animals; some even consider providing luxury items to be part of the 
responsibility of owning a companion animal.1 It is perhaps not surprising, 
then, that animal guardians are now initiating lawsuits when their 
companion animals are wrongfully killed. However, legally, animals are 
chattels. This status as personal property means that, under the law of 
damages, an owner suing for the wrongful death of his companion animal 
is usually limited to recovering its market value.2 
The question, then, is whether a claim for damages for the loss of a 
companion animal in excess of its market value should ever succeed and, 
if so, on what basis.3 This paper aims to demonstrate the insufficiency of 
the current approach. It aims further to identify alternative methods of 
valuation which more accurately reflect the social reality that, of all the 
things that the law classifies as chattels, companion animals alone uniquely 
develop a bond with their guardian and are valued primarily, if not solely, 
1  See for example Lisan Jutras, “Have we all gone doggone crazy?” The Globe and Mail 
(October 23, 2007) L2, an article which discusses Canadian society’s tendency to treat its 
pets like family members, purchasing clothing for them, taking them to dog “spaws” and 
in some cases referring to a pet dog as one’s “baby”; see also Rebecca Dube, ““Owners 
Desperately Seeking Fido: Call in Sherlock Bones” The Globe and Mail (February 21, 2008) 
L1, where it is noted that a Toronto businessman offered a $15,000 reward for the return 
of his lost chocolate lab.
2  Jamie Cassels, Remedies: The Law of Damages (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2000) at 75.  
Where a chattel is destroyed, the default measure of damages is cost of replacement. 
Where a chattel is damaged, as opposed to destroyed, the default measure of damages is 
usually the reasonable cost of repair which could, conceivably, far exceed market value of 
the companion animal if, for example, surgery was required to “repair” the companion 
animal.
3  As will be discussed below, the majority of Canadian actions brought for damages for 
the loss of a companion animal have arisen out of alleged negligent conduct on the part 
of the defendant and this paper primarily addresses damages in that context. The cause of 
action could also, however, be an intentional tort (which would bring with it an increased 
opportunity to succeed in a claim for either aggravated or compensatory damages) or for 
breach of contract. 
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on non-economic grounds.4 The merits and shortcomings of compensation 
for mental distress and for loss of companionship are examined, as are the 
pros and cons of legislative change and using loss of investment to value 
companion animals’ lives. Reference to loss of investment will be shown 
to be the preferable guide to valuation of claims, while legislative change 
appears to be the most effective potential means of carrying out this paper’s 
proposed changes to valuing companion animals. 
II. ANIMALS ARE PROPERTY, PETS ARE FAMILY?
(a)  The Common Law View: Animals are Chattels
A succinct and accurate statement of the traditional view the common 
law takes of animals can be found in the reasons of Justice Wallace in 
Diversified Holdings v. British Columbia where he observed that,
In the beginning, Genesis said mankind should ‘have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of 
the air, and over the cattle, and over every creeping thing 
that creepeth upon the earth’. However, as society became 
more sophisticated and man brought certain animals 
into a state of subjection, under English law at least it 
was considered appropriate to distinguish between those 
animals which under normal circumstances are usually 
4  Many academic commentators writing on the issue of valuation of companion 
animals have focused on the bond which develops between companion animal and 
animal guardian as highlighting the inadequacy of the current common law approach 
(albeit in the context of the American common law). See for example Stephen M. Wise, 
“Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society and Loss 
of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal” (1998) 4 Animal L. 
33; Debra Squires-Lee, “In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals 
in Tort” (1995) 70 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1059; and Elaine T. Byszewski, “Valuing Companion 
Animals in Wrongful Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court and Legislative Action and 
a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship” (2003) 9 Animal L. 215. 
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found at liberty, animals ferae naturae, and those animals 
which are generally tame, living in association with man, 
animals mansuetae or domitae naturae. Domestic animals 
are the subject of absolute ownership, with all the rights, 
duties, privileges and obligations that relationship entails.5
Canadian jurisprudence is rife with similar references to the status of 
animals as chattels. For example, the dissenting judgment in Harvard 
College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) dismissed an argument 
put forward by animal rights activists simply by referring to animals’ 
status as property. Justice Binnie writes, “[o]f course, whatever position 
is adopted under patent law, animals have been and will continue to be 
used in laboratories for scientific research. Pets are property.”6 A judgment 
from British Columbia, in a decision involving an action brought in 
relation to a dog, held that animals must be viewed by the law as “just 
another consumer product”.7 Furthermore, the provisions prohibiting 
cruelty against animals in the Criminal Code, are located in part XI, under 
the section entitled “Wilful and Forbidden Acts in Respect of Certain 
Property.”8 
These examples illustrate that the status of animals as property is enshrined 
deeply within Canada’s common law and statutory legal framework. 
Clearly, then, any change to the status of animals as chattels brings with 
it the possibility for change in a variety of legal contexts. However, if such 
a change is limited in scope to companion animals alone, these concerns 
diminish. 
5  Diversified Holdings v. British Columbia (1982), 133 D.L.R. (3d) 712, 3 W.W.R. 516, 
(B.C.S.C.) at para. 16 [Diversified Holdings cited to D.L.R.].
6  2002 SCC 76, 219 D.L.R. (4th) 577, at para. 100.
7  Pezzente v. McClain, [2005] 2005 BCPC 352, B.C.J. No. 1800, (Prov. Ct.) (eC) at para. 15 
[Pezzente]. 
8  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 446.
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(b)  Recovery for Destruction of Chattels is Usually Fair Market Value 
(Cost of Replacement)
When a chattel is destroyed, the position at common law is generally that 
the appropriate measure of damages is that amount which represents 
the replacement cost of the destroyed good.9 For inanimate chattels for 
which there is a current market, this principle makes eminent sense; 
its application permits a plaintiff to replace her destroyed good with a 
like good, while holding the defendant responsible only for the actual 
economic loss he caused.10 When this principle is applied to companion 
animals, however, it makes less sense: an award for the market value of the 
companion animal is not capable of restoring what has been lost. 
Although the law currently takes the view that a companion animal 
is a chattel, in reality what is lost when a companion animal dies is a 
relationship, rather than a good available for trade in an open market. 
Recovery for market value therefore fails to return the plaintiff to 
the position he was in before he sustained the loss, the ultimate goal 
underlying recovery in tort.11  The illogical result of the current approach 
to valuation of companion animals has been described as being that, “[i]t 
awards damages for a loss that the owner of a companion animal does not 
actually suffer (economic value) and refuses to compensate an owner for 
the damages that an owner actually does suffer (emotional distress and loss 
of society).”12  
9  Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages, 17th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 
2003) at 1059 [McGregor On Damages]. See for example Tremear v. Park Town Motor 
Hotels Ltd., [1982] 4 W.W.R. 444 (Sask. Q.B.) as reproduced in McGregor on Damages at 
1059.
10  McGregor on Damages, supra note 9 at 1072-1073, cites Hall v. Barclay [1937] 3All E.R. 
620 (C.A.) at 623, where Greer L.J. explains: “[W]here you are dealing with goods which 
can be readily bought in the market a man whose rights have been interfered with is never 
entitled to more than what he would pay to buy a similar article elsewhere.”
11  McGregor on Damages, supra  note 9 at p. 13. The author cites to Livingstone  v. 
Rawyards Coal Co. (1880) 5App.Cas.25 at 39.
12  Wise, supra note 4 at p. 33.
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(c)  The Social Reality: Companion Animals are Family Members
In the United States, a number of writers have pointed to the bond between 
companion animal and animal guardian as well as the fact that companion 
animals are treated as family members, rather than inanimate chattels, 
to support the argument that market value is an inadequate approach to 
determine compensation.13  The same sentiments, that companion animals 
are essentially family, appear to be widely held by Canadian citizens. 
A recent study of Canadian animal guardians indicates that 83% of 
Canadian animal guardians view their companion animal as a member 
of the family.14 Conversely, a mere 15% of participants in the same survey 
viewed the love they had for their companion animal as being based on 
the animal’s status as a pet, as opposed to its status as a family member.15 
The study also found that for many pet-owners, a pet was treated in many 
respects as a child of the family.16
The amount of money which Canadian citizens are willing to spend in 
caring for a companion animal also indicates that they are valued in 
non-economic terms. In 2001, the average Canadian dog-owner spent 
over $650 per dog, and the average cat-owner $380 per cat.17  These high 
expenditures support the assertion that guardians value their companion 
animals primarily on non-economic grounds.18
13  See for example Squires-Lee, supra note 4 at 1065, and Wise, supra note 3 at 45.
14  Ipsos-Reid, “Paws and Claws: A Syndicated Study on Canadian Pet Ownership” (June, 
2001), online: Ipsos Canada  <http://www.ctv.ca/generic/WebSpecials/pdf/Paws_and_
Claws.pdf> at p. 4 [“Paws and Claws”]. 
15  Ibid.
16  “Paws and Claws”, supra note 14 at 4-5. The study concluded that 69% of pet owners 
allow their pets to sleep with them, 60% either carried their pet’s photo in their wallet or 
displayed it with other family photos, and that almost all (98%) pet owners talked to their 
pets. 
17  Ibid. at 9.
18  Squires-Lee, supra note 4 at 1065-1067.   
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(d)  The Bond between Guardian and Companion Animal Provides 
a Rational Basis upon which Companion Animals can be 
Distinguished from other Chattels
The relationship which develops between animal guardian and companion 
animal provides a rational basis upon which Canadian courts could 
distinguish companion animals from other forms of personal property. 
Animals used in farming operations or laboratories can properly, if 
distastefully, be referred to as commodities in the sense that their value 
lies solely in their ability to generate income, meaning that they have an 
ascertainable economic value measurable by current market rates.19 As with 
non-companion animals, the value of an inanimate chattel such as a stereo 
is determinable, in almost every case, by reference to what an individual is 
willing to pay for it on a free and open market.20 The value of a companion 
animal in the eyes of its animal guardian, on the other hand, has little to do 
with economics; the value of a companion animal flows instead from the 
unique relationship between the two.21 Distinguishing between companion 
animals and other forms of personal property is therefore neither arbitrary 
nor difficult once this fundamental difference is acknowledged.  
As obvious as this distinction appears to be to those who advocate for 
a method of valuation other than market value for companion animals, 
critics have argued that retreating from the present legal position 
would not only disturb years of precedent but also cause unintended 
19 Wise, supra, note 4 at 70, Wise persuasively argues that, “The distinction between 
nonhuman animals, whose use is entirely economic, and companion animals…remains 
obvious today. As far as the producer, the slaughterhouse worker, the processor, the 
grocer, and the consumer are concerned, one sheep may be the same as another…Market 
value as a measure of damages only makes sense as compensation for the wrongful deaths 
of nonhuman animals whose owners consider them fungible…” 
20  There are limited exceptions where Canadian courts have allowed recovery in excess 
of market value in circumstances where the property in issue had special or unique value 
to the owner. See for example Wilson v. Sooter Studios Ltd. (1988), 33 B.C.L.R. (2d) 241 
(C.A.), where the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s award of 
the cost of the wedding pictures and an additional $1000, to reflect the intrinsic value 
of the photos to the plaintiffs, against the defendant photographer who failed to deliver 
contracted photos.  
21  Wise, supra note 4 at 49.
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consequences  when valuing other forms of property.22 The argument is 
that if recovery for non-economic loss in the form of mental distress is 
permitted in actions for the wrongful death of companion animals (read: 
destruction of chattels), non-economic damages for destruction to other 
chattels will, ipso facto, become recoverable.23 
Judicial support for this argument was found in the observation of an 
American court that to allow damages for mental stress in companion 
animal actions, “would permit recovery for mental stress caused by the 
malicious or negligent destruction of other personal property.”24 However, 
this fear appears unfounded in the Canadian context. Canadian courts 
have on occasion distinguished between “ordinary” chattels, which are to 
be valued at their market value, and chattels which may need to be valued 
in a different manner because the destroyed chattel had a “special” or 
“unique” value to the owner.25 
Moreover, some of the lower Canadian courts which have considered the 
issue of companion animals specifically have recognized that the relationship 
between animal guardian and companion animal may provide sufficient 
reason to view it as more than a mere chattel. For example, that the label 
“chattel” is inadequate is borne out in Canadian jurisprudence where judges 
have recognized that companion animals are “loved companion[s].”26  One 
judge has even gone so far as to explicitly criticize the principle that animal 
companions must be viewed as simply consumer products, observing, “In 
my view, that characterization as a general proposition, is incorrect in law.”27
22  Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird, “Non-Economic Damages in Pet Litigation: The 
Serious Need to Preserve a Rational Rule” (1996) 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 227 at 237-238 and 258-
259.
23  Ibid. at 238.
24  Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S. 2d 627, 628 (NY Sup Ct 2001), reproduced in Ibid. at 237 
[Johnson].
25  See for example Chappell v. Barati (1984), 20 C.C.L.T. 137 (Ont. H.C.), where damages 
were allowed in the amount of $7,500 when the defendant negligently caused a fire which 
destroyed several thousand trees planted by the plaintiff even though the diminution in 
market value was negligible.
26  Brown v. Edwards, [2005] O.J. No. 1800 (Sup. Ct. (Sm. Cl. Div.)), at para. 18 [Brown], 
reversed by Brown v. Edwards [2006] O.J. 3595 (Sup. Ct.) [Brown Sup. Ct.].
27  Ferguson v. Birchmount Boarding Kennels (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 681 (Div. Ct.), at para. 20 
Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 183Vol. 17
While relying upon the status of (companion) animals as chattels at 
common law may provide an uncomplicated justification to deny recovery 
in excess of market value, it does not reflect current views. Canadian social 
values are no longer, if they ever were, in alignment with a proposition of 
law which views companion animals as being solely chattels. Giving effect 
to this social value, and allowing awards in excess of market value, could 
well be within the scope of the judiciary’s authority to effect “incremental 
change” to the common law in order to “bring it into step with a changing 
society.”28  
III. DAMAGES: THE APPROACHES TAKEN IN 
CANADIAN COMPANION ANIMAL ACTIONS
The early Canadian jurisprudence, which considered the possibility 
of recovery in excess of market value, relied heavily upon companion 
animals’ status as chattels to deny such an award. More recent decisions, 
however, suggest that a shift in mentality may be occurring. While the 
decisions discussed below (in which damages in excess of market value 
were awarded) cannot be said to be binding authority for the proposition 
that companion animals should be valued by something other than market 
value, they do indicate at the very least a new-found willingness on the part 
of the judiciary to make such awards.
(a)  Perspective One: Status as Chattels is of Primary Importance
Emphasis upon the legal classification of companion animals as property 
was relied upon most strongly in cases where sales legislation intersected 
[Ferguson]. 
28  R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 at para. 29 per Iacobucci J.:“In keeping with these 
developments, this court has signaled its willingness to adapt and develop common law 
rules to reflect changing circumstances in society at large…The common theme of these 
cases is that, while complex changes to the law with uncertain ramifications should be left 
to the legislature, the courts can and should make incremental changes to the common 
law to bring legal rules into step with a changing society.”
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with the action. In cases in which the judge’s initial determination that a 
companion animal was a chattel attracted by operation of law provincial 
sales legislation, the legal status of the companion animal as a chattel 
effectively foreclosed the judge from considering awards in excess of 
market value. 
In Pezzente the claimant brought an action against a dog breeder in relation 
to a dog (purchased from the breeder), which turned out to suffer from 
numerous health problems, despite the warranties given by the breeder at 
the time of sale. The judge determined that although he was not “dealing 
with the usual ‘chattel’, but with an animal who…is a well loved member 
of [the plaintiff ’s family]…the law is coldly unemotional and I really must 
view Bear as just another consumer product.”29  The relevant provincial 
sales legislation therefore applied and damages were limited to those which 
were the direct and natural result of the breach of warranty.30
On the issue of what was reasonable in determining damages, the 
judge held that it had to be made on the basis of what was reasonable 
economically and not emotionally. The decision to have the surgery 
performed on the dog was, in the judge’s opinion, an emotional one and 
not an economic one.31 The submission of defence counsel, likening Bear 
to a $350 stereo, was adopted by the judge, who concluded that, “You don’t 
spend $10,000 to repair a $350 stereo.”32 Damages were awarded for only 
the market value of the dog.33 
The provision the trial judge relied upon to limit the recovery of damages 
was s. 56(2) of the British Columbia Sale of Goods Act which provided 
at the time that “[t]he measure of damages for breach of warranty is the 
estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of 
events, from the breach of warranty.”34 However, this statutory language 
29  Pezzente, supra note 7 at paras. 3-4.
30  Ibid. at para. 10.
31  Ibid. at para. 11. 
32 Ibid.
33  Ibid. at para. 16.
34  Sale of Goods Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 410, s. 56. 
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is simply a codification of the principle at common law that the only 
loss which is to be compensated for is that which is foreseeable, as was 
established in Hadley v. Baxendale.35 Arguably, Justice Auxier erred in 
concluding that this language required him to limit the amount of damages 
that were recoverable by the plaintiff to economic harm. 
Gandy v. Robinson36 was a decision of the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s 
Bench considering a fact situation similar to that in Pezzente. In this case, 
some time after the plaintiff purchased a dog from the defendant for $350, 
it became apparent that the dog suffered from a defective hip; the plaintiff 
spent $1400 to repair the dog’s hip and sought to recover those costs or a 
refund of the purchase price of the dog from the defendant.37 The judge 
hearing the matter determined that the Consumer Product Warranty and 
Liability Act governed the situation and rejected the claim.38 As in Pezzante, 
companion animals were viewed as ordinary chattels which were to be 
accorded the same treatment under the law as any other chattel:
The defendants as sellers of the consumer product under 
warranty have at all times stood ready to take back 
the product and refund the purchase price. The law of 
purchase and sale does not expect sellers of a defective 
home entertainment system or a defective burglar system 
to do more than that. I am not convinced that there 
should be a different rule for a defective dog.39 
One curious aspect of these decisions is that, while relying on the status of the 
dog in question as a chattel to limit recovery, both judges implicitly recognized 
that a companion animal is not really property comparable in kind to an 
inanimate chattel. In Pezzente the trial judge observed that he would not order 
the possible alternative remedy available under the Sale of Goods Act (requiring 
the defendant to replace the dog) as he “…would not anticipate the latter 
alternative being acceptable to the claimant because the very word ‘replace’ 
35  (1854), 9 Exch. 341, 156 E.R. 145.
36  (1990), 108 N.B.R. 436 (Q.B.) [Gandy].
37  Ibid., at 437-438.
38  Ibid. at 439-440.
39  Ibid. at 440.
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means she would be required to relinquish Bear to the defendant.”40 The trial 
judge in Gandy similarly acknowledged the special relationship which forms 
between human and companion animal when he referred to a book about dog 
ownership and, holding that it properly described the relationship between 
man and dog, quoted the following excerpt with approval: 
They have so much to offer us. They are playful 
companions when we are in the mood for fun; they are 
loving companions when we are lonely or depressed; 
they are health-giving companions when they stir us into 
taking long walks; they are calming companions when we 
become agitated…41
(b)  Perspective Two: Wrongful Death Actions can Support an  
Award for Mental Distress
In contrast to the above decisions, there are several cases which suggest 
that compensatory damages for mental distress are recoverable at common 
law in wrongful death actions for companion animals. Not surprisingly, 
these decisions justify such awards by referring to the bond between 
animal guardian and companion animal, and to the family-like relationship 
between animal and guardian.   Perhaps more significant to the outcomes, 
though, were the existence of fairly unusual fact situations that permitted 
the triers of fact to circumvent the traditional legal view that market value 
was the only available measure of damages. 
In the Ontario case of Somerville v. Malloy, an elderly male plaintiff 
successfully sued the defendant after the defendant’s dog attacked and 
killed the plaintiff ’s dog, injuring the plaintiff in the process.42 Although 
the plaintiff in this case was awarded $20,000 for the emotional trauma 
and mental distress he suffered as a result of the attack, the unique facts 
of this case suggest that its precedential value may be limited.43  
40  Pezzente, supra note 7 at para. 16.
41  Desmond Morris, Dogwatching (London: J. Cape, 1986) at 1 and 5 as quoted in Gandy, 
supra, note 36 at 438.
42  (1999), 106 O.T.C. 389, 92 A.C.W.S. (3d) 560 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Somerville].
43  Ibid., at para. 19.
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For instance, Ontario had legislation in place which held dog owners 
strictly liable for damages from a bite or attack by their dog on another 
person or another domestic animal.44  The plaintiff also suffered mental 
distress which was capable of (some) medical verification.45 Most 
importantly, however, the plaintiff himself was physically injured during 
the incident, suffering a bite to the elbow which had left a small scar.46 
While it may be tempting to read this decision as being strong authority for 
awarding damages for the loss of a companion animal in excess of market 
value, the injury to the plaintiff himself appears to be a necessary hook for 
an award of this magnitude. 
The judge did, however, mention that damages for mental distress are 
routinely permitted by Canadian courts, emphasizing that it was not the 
statute itself that created the possibility of recovery for mental distress: 
[A]s for recovering damages for emotional trauma or 
mental distress, our courts regularly compensate victims 
in this respect without the victim having to establish that 
he or she experienced nervous shock. One need only 
looks to the many decisions in the field of damages for 
wrongful dismissal to see that mental distress is a proper 
head of damage when the circumstances are proven to 
exist.47 
The plaintiffs in Newell et al. v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd. were also 
successful in their action for mental distress damages in the wrongful death 
of their companion animal.48 Unlike all of the other case law in Canada 
addressing the issue, the cause of action in this case arose following a breach 
of contract, rather than negligence. Like the plaintiff in Somerville, however, 
these plaintiffs had a fairly unique factual basis supporting their claim.
44  Ibid. at para. 12; Municipalities S.O. 1989 ch. 84 s.20.
45  Somerville, supra note 42 at para.10. The plaintiff at the time of trial required medication 
to help him sleep. 
46  Ibid. at para. 8.
47  Ibid. at para. 15.
48  (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 574 (Ont. Co. Ct.) [Newell].
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As a result of the negligence of the defendant passenger airline, one of the 
plaintiffs’ companion animals was killed and the other became severely 
ill while the plaintiffs and their pets were travelling onboard a flight to 
Mexico.49  The judge in this case relied upon the development of a line 
of cases in England which held that the reasonably foreseeable damages 
in a breach of contract case may, at times, include damages for mental 
distress.50 Concluding that the state of the law was the same in Ontario 
as in England on this point, the judge awarded $500 for the mental 
distress suffered by the plaintiffs upon learning that one of their dogs had 
died while en route to Mexico, and that the other was extremely ill. The 
mental distress the judge identified was not severe or incapacitating; the 
judge simply observed that the plaintiffs were “genuinely affected by their 
unfortunate experience.”51 
The most recent actions involving companion animals indicate that 
courts are less willing to accept the argument that because animals 
are property at law, recovery must be limited to market value. For 
example, in Brown the claimant animal guardians were successful at 
the court of first instance in a wrongful death action against their 
veterinarian.52 Making the usual observations that the deceased dog 
was valued as “not only a chattel but as a loved companion”53 and that 
“Tina was an important and rewarding member of the family,”54 the 
49  Ibid. at 576.
50  Newell, supra, note 48 at 585-593. The trial judge referred to three decisions of the Court 
of Appeal of England where damages for “vexation, frustration and distress” were awarded 
where it met the test of reasonable foreseeability laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale, supra 
note 35 .  These decisions, frequently referred to as the holiday cases, are:  Jarvis v. Swans 
Tours Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 233 [Jarvis]; Jackson v. Horizon Holidays Ltd., [1975] 3 All E.R. 
92; Heywood v. Wellers (a firm), [1976] 1 All E.R. 300 [Heywood].  The English House of 
Lords more recently considered the issue of awarding damages for mental distress arising 
out of  breach of contract in Farley v. Skinner, [2002] 2 A.C. 2002. These three “holiday 
cases” were considered in the judgment and the court held that damages for mental 
distress arising out of breach of contract were possible where the plaintiff could show 
that one of the goals of the contract was peace of mind, as opposed to being the sole or 
primary goal of the contract as was the case in each of the holiday cases. 
51 Newell, supra note 48 at 586. 
52  The decision was reversed on appeal in Brown Sup. Ct., supra note 26, on other grounds. 
53  Brown, supra note 26 at para. 18.
54  Supra note 26 at para. 22.
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judge proceeded to award the plaintiffs damages in the amount of 
$3,500.55
A number of factors were referred to as supporting the award in Brown. 
The judge considered the age of the dog and the likelihood that she would 
live another four years,56 the way in which the plaintiffs treated the dog 
(as their child),57 the time that the plaintiffs spent playing with the dog,58 
and the distress suffered by the female plaintiff on learning of the dog’s 
death.59 Although it is not clear entirely what role mental distress played in 
the award, it is clear that it played some role, as evidenced by the fact that 
the female plaintiff was apportioned $2,000 of the total damages awarded, 
while her husband received only $1,500 of the general damages award, on 
the basis that her mental distress was more severe.60 
The most recent of the actions involving the wrongful death of a 
companion animal follows the approach taken in Brown by, again, making 
an award for mental distress. In Ferguson the claimant animal guardians 
were awarded damages for the pain and suffering they suffered as a result 
of the negligent loss of their dog by the defendant. On appeal, Justice 
Chapnik held that the award was justifiable, given the facts as found by the 
trial judge. Those facts were the emotionally distraught and hysterical state 
of the plaintiff on learning of the dog’s loss, the relationship the plaintiffs 
had had with the dog for 7 1/2 years, and the inability to work, insomnia 
and nightmares from which the female plaintiff suffered following the dog’s 
death.61 
55  Ibid. at para. 23. 
56  Ibid. at para. 20.
57  Ibid. at para. 21.
58  Ibid.
59  Ibid. at para. 22.
60  Ibid. at paras. 22-23.
61 Ferguson, supra note 27 at 686-687. 
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(c)  A Consistent Approach has not yet Been Determined in  
Canadian Law
Thus, the approach taken by Canadian courts when confronted with 
companion animal actions has varied. The decisions have ranged from 
total reliance on legal status as functioning to limit damages to the market 
value of the companion animal, to outright denial of the suggestion that a 
companion animal could ever be termed an “ordinary” chattel, akin to any 
other consumer product available on the market. 
Given the minimal amount of Canadian jurisprudence in this area, and the 
total lack of any appellate court commentary, it is difficult to hypothesize 
what any court will do in the future when confronted with this issue. 
It does, however, appear that if a court is provided with a rational basis 
upon which to award damages in excess of market value it will do so. This 
issue of proper valuation of companion animals is likely to be revisited in 
the near future: class actions have been initiated in at least two provinces 
against the manufacturers of allegedly tainted pet food.62 The issue then, for 
those advocating such awards, will be to identify just such a rational basis. 
IV.  DAMAGE AWARDS COMPENSATING  
FOR MENTAL DISTRESS
(a)  The Awards in Ferguson and Brown Compensate for Grief 
The awards in Ferguson and Brown were, ostensibly, for mental distress 
suffered by the animal guardians. However, an examination of the facts 
as found by the trial judges reveals that the mental suffering being 
compensated for was in reality grief, as neither decision refers to an 
identifiable mental illness or psychological effect suffered by the relevant 
plaintiff. 
62  Whiting v. Menu Foods Operating Ltd. [2007] O.J. No. 3996 (Sup. Ct.);  Joel v. Menu 
Foods GenPar Ltd. (2007), 2007 BCSC 1482, B.C.J. No. 2159, (S.C.).
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While most provinces have, through legislative enactment, allowed for 
recovery of some non-economic loss upon the death of a closely related third 
party, few have gone as far as to permit recovery for grief.63 Indeed, it appears 
that only three provinces currently permit recovery for grief: residents of New 
Brunswick can claim damages for “companionship and grief”, while Alberta 
and Saskatchewan have provisions which expressly permit recovery for 
bereavement (at capped amounts) upon proof of the wrongful death itself.64 
There is a negative inference that can be drawn from the fact that the 
majority of Canadian provinces and territories have not yet created a 
statutory right of recovery for grief, while allowing compensation for 
other non-pecuniary losses. The inference is that the legislatures do not 
yet consider grief to be a loss for which the tort system should provide 
compensation. Indeed, courts have recognized that to award damages 
for grief, some mention of that possibility would have to be made in the 
relevant act itself; non-pecuniary losses recoverable by statute: 
[P]roperly exclude[s] grief, sorrow and mental anguish 
suffered by reason of the death as compensable items of 
damage. Non-pecuniary loss of this kind, unlike guidance, 
care and companionship, are not provided for in the Act 
and under its terms remain non-recoverable.65
On this basis it is submitted that it is improper for the judiciary to award 
damages for ‘mental distress’ to circumvent the common law status of 
companion animals as chattels when, in reality, the judiciary is permitting 
recovery for grief. By describing the loss suffered as mental distress, the 
judiciary attempts to permit recovery for an emotional injury that is not 
compensable at common law. 
63  Ontario, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island permit recovery for loss of 
care, guidance and companionship when a family member is wrongfully killed: Family 
Law Act, RSO 1990, c. F.3, as am. by SO 1999, c. 6, s. 25(5), s. 61; Fatal Accident Acts, 
CCSM, c. F50, s. 3.1; Fatal Injuries Act, RSNS 1989, c. 163, as am. by 2000, c. 29, ss. 9-12, s. 
5(2)d; Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F-5, s. 6(3)(d).
64  Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-7 s. 3(4)(d), Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. 
F-8 s. 8; Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. F-11, s. 4.
65  Mason v. Peters et al. (1982), 139 D.L.R. (3d) 104 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 118.
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(b)  Distress and Employment Law: An Inappropriate Comparison to 
the Companion Animal Context
Even if one accepts that the plaintiffs in Brown and Ferguson were being 
compensated for mental distress, as opposed to grief, the awards remain 
problematic under the common law. Recovery for mental distress in this 
context must also be resisted as it leads to the irrational result that recovery 
in the wrongful death of a companion animal would be possible where the 
same facts would not give rise to recovery if the wrongfully killed party 
were a human.66 
In Somerville the judge observed that mental distress awards are commonly 
made “in this respect without the victim having to establish that he or she 
experienced nervous shock.”67 However, this is not entirely accurate. Justice 
Sheppard there referred to the area of employment law as an example of an 
area of law where courts readily make awards for mental distress awards.68 
Employment law is, however, not an appropriate analogy to wrongful death 
actions for companion animals for at least two reasons. 
An award for mental distress in relation to wrongful dismissal seeks to 
compensate the plaintiff for harm suffered by him directly, as opposed 
to harm suffered by a third party.  Secondly, mental distress awards in 
the context of wrongful dismissal are typically awards for aggravated 
damages.69 Although aggravated damages are compensatory in nature, they 
are also related to the conduct of the defendant in that they reflect that the 
defendant was particularly “callous, high-handed or malicious” in the way 
in which he acted towards the plaintiff.70  
66  Schwartz & Laird, supra note 22 beginning at 256, the authors make the same argument 
in the American context. 
67  Somerville, supra note 42 at para. 15.
68  Ibid.
69  See for example Pilon v. Peugeot Canada Ltd. (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 711 (H.C.). The 
plaintiff was awarded $7, 500 in aggravated damages for the mental distress he suffered 
upon his wrongful dismissal.
70  Cassels, supra note 2 at 195-196. Aggravated damages were explained in Huff v. Price 
(1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 282 (C.A.) at 299: “[A]ggravated damages are an award, or an 
augmentation of an award, of compensatory damages for non-pecuniary loss. They are 
designed to compensate the plaintiff, and they are measured by the plaintiff ’s suffering….
It is, of course, not the damages that are aggravated but the injury. The damage award is 
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Unlike in the employment context, the injury complained of in a 
companion animal wrongful death action (giving rise to the mental distress 
suffered by the plaintiff) is inflicted upon a third party (the companion 
animal), not the claimant. Even more significant, however, is the fact 
that there has yet to be a case in Canada in which the wrongful death of 
a companion animal was the result of intentional, rather than negligent, 
conduct. The negligent behavior in both Brown (failure to maintain proper 
care and attention while walking the dog)71 and Ferguson (failure to inspect 
a fence for possible escape routes)72 are not capable of supporting an 
aggravated damages award as the conduct that caused the loss cannot be 
said to be “callous, malicious, or high-handed.”73  
(c)  Negligent or Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering 
A more appropriate comparator group for plaintiffs in companion 
animal wrongful death actions, and any attendant mental distress which 
subsequently arises, lies in cases where courts have considered whether or 
not to award damages for the intentional or negligent infliction of nervous 
shock, where that shock arises because of injury or death to a person other 
than the claimant.74 However, in cases of this kind Canadian courts have 
been relatively cautious. Rather than allowing recovery for any and all 
mental distress, Canadian courts have followed where the English have led 
and required that the plaintiff meet fairly strict criteria before qualifying 
for compensation for mental distress.75 A plaintiff seeking compensation 
for aggravation of the injury by the Defendant’s high-handed conduct.” 
71  Brown, supra note 26 at paras. 8-11.
72 Ferguson, supra note 27 at 684-685.
73  Cassels, supra note 2 at 202.The author explains that, “Generally, aggravated damages 
(beyond those available for the “pain and suffering” associated with a personal injury) 
are awarded only when there is advertent malicious conduct by the plaintiff. Thus, cases 
involving inadvertence (negligence), while sometimes giving rise to general damages for 
pain and suffering, will rarely give rise to additional aggravated damages.”
74  Schwartz, supra note 22 at 251. The authors there make the same argument and refer 
to the need to consider the law of intentional or negligent infliction of mental suffering 
when contemplating making awards in excess of market value for companion animals, 
beginning at.
75  The origins of recovery for “nervous shock” lie in the decision of Wilkinson v. Downton 
[1897], 2 Q.B. 57, as cited in Lewis N. Klar, Tort Law, 3rd ed. (Scarborough: Thomson 
Canada Limited, 2003) at 72-73. Klar summarized the holding as follows: “The tort 
requires (1) an act or statement (2) calculated to produce harm and (3) harm. It clearly 
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for nervous shock is required to demonstrate that she suffered harm as a 
result of the defendant’s negligent or intentional act, and that the nervous 
shock suffered was reasonably foreseeable. 76
The harm suffered is perhaps the easiest aspect of this cause of action 
to deal with as courts have been fairly consistent in their findings as to 
what kind of harm is compensable. Courts have held consistently that the 
claimant must have suffered “some recognizable psychiatric illness.”77 As it 
is described in Devji v. Burnaby (District), the threshold is not a low one; it 
requires that the plaintiff: 
[E]xperience something more than the surprise and 
other emotional responses that naturally follow from 
learning of the death of a friend or relative...there must be 
something more that separates actionable responses from 
the understandable grief, sorrow and loss that ordinarily 
follow the receipt of this information.”78
In considering the harm suffered courts have, for example, distinguished 
between post-traumatic stress disorder and mere bereavement; even 
where both are the result of the same traumatic event, only the former is 
compensable.79 
Canadian courts have not yet come to a definitive conclusion as to 
whether or not the reasonable foreseeability requirement of this cause of 
did not contemplate an action based on negligence.” The action does now, however, extend 
to negligent acts. See for example Martin v. Mineral Springs Hospital, [2001] W.W.R.  298 
(Alta. Q.B.) [Martin].
76  Allan M. Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law, 8th ed. (Canada: LexisNexis 
Canada Inc., 2006) at 428.
77  Heighington v. Ontario, [1987] O.J. No. 725, 60 O.R. (2d) 641 (H.C.) as cited in Linden 
& Feldthusen at 426.
78  Devji v. Burnaby (District) (1999), [2002] 2 W.W.R. 12 at para. 75 [Devji].
79  Martin, supra, note 75. The plaintiff husband was denied damages for mental distress 
when he witnessed the still-born delivery of his first child. Although the doctor’s 
negligence caused the still-birth and the plaintiff suffered “tremendous grief and sorrow” 
he did not suffer from a recognizable medical illness and was denied recovery on that 
basis.  
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action must include a consideration of certain “control mechanisms” to 
limit liability.80  Three control mechanisms have, however, been applied 
at different times by various courts in Canada: the absence of temporal, 
locational or relational proximity has been relied upon to deny recovery.81 
The aspect of temporal proximity is most easily satisfied when the plaintiff 
witnesses the event itself, or arrives upon the scene shortly after it occurs 
without being advised by an intermediary that the accident occurred.82 As 
temporal proximity is concerned with the plaintiff ’s direct perception of 
the accident, attendance at a hospital very shortly after the accident may 
also satisfy this requirement. However, plaintiffs have been denied recovery 
when they were advised by telephone of the fatal injury suffered by a family 
member and then arrived at the hospital already fully aware of the death.83 
There the Court denied recovery because it was not reasonably foreseeable 
that nervous shock would be caused, reasoning that as people “view the 
bodies of deceased persons for a number of reasons on many occasions and 
psychological injury is not what one expects or would reasonably foresee 
from such an experience.”84 Similarly, locational proximity will frequently 
be satisfied wherever temporal proximity is satisfied, as it is concerned with 
whether or not the plaintiff was present at the accident or its immediate 
aftermath. 
 
80  The United Kingdom has accepted that there must be a distinction between primary 
and secondary victim cases where psychological illness is caused. In cases where the 
claimant is a secondary victim he must establish, in addition to reasonable foreseeability 
of psychiatric injury in a person of normal fortitude, that certain indicators of proximity 
existed between the plaintiff and the defendant: White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
Police (1998), [1999] 2 A.C. 455 (U.K. H.L)  
81  Whether these three control mechanisms are necessary for the proper application of the 
two-part test for liability adopted in Nielsen v. Kamloops (City) (1984), [1984] 5 W.W.R. 1 
was recently questioned in Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd. (2006), 43 C.C.L.T. (3d) 
27, 275 D.L.R. (4th) 473 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 
109.
82  Abou-Marie (Litigation Guardian of) v. Baskey, [2001] O.J. No. 4842, [2001] O.T.C. 876 
(Sup. Ct.). Mother entitled to damages for negligent infliction of nervous shock when she 
arrived home and saw her daughter’s body on the lawn after it had been hit by car. 
83  Devji, supra note 78.
84  Ibid. at para. 63.
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The relational aspect of proximity requires that there be a close, although 
not necessarily familial, relationship between the person injured and the 
plaintiff seeking relief.85 Although initially only familial relationships were 
considered to be adequate, more recent decisions seem to indicate that 
other relationships could satisfy the requirement.86 
(i)  Negligent or Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering and the 
Companion Animal Jurisprudence
While it may be comforting that two Canadian judges have recognized that 
the value of a relationship with a companion animal may exceed its market 
value, the facts in Brown and Ferguson fail to bring the plaintiffs within the 
requirements for recovery for psychiatric harm. The plaintiffs in both cases 
were advised of the loss of their companion animal over the telephone, 
and, moreover, neither party appeared to come remotely close to suffering 
from a recognizable psychiatric illness. 
Allowing damages for mental distress suffered as a result of a companion 
animal’s death where the requirements of proximity to the accident and a 
recognizable physical or psychological illness are not also satisfied would 
permit recovery when a companion animal is wrongfully killed where it 
would be impossible if the third-party were human. Not only is this an 
absurd result, but it would also provide a basis for future litigants in human 
wrongful death actions to argue that the law in relation to mental distress 
has been relaxed in terms of the evidentiary requirements necessary to 
establish this cause of action.87   
However, where the requirements of proximity and mental illness are 
satisfied in the context of a wrongful death action relating to a companion 
animal, recovery should be allowed.  A court in those circumstances 
would not be compensating for grief or ignoring the common law as it has 
developed in relation to nervous shock; rather, it would be compensating 
for a real injury suffered by the plaintiff. Although to date recovery for 
85  Linden & Feldthusen, supra note 76 at 432.
86  See for example Devji, supra note 78. 
87  Schwartz & Laird, supra note 22 at p. 251.
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mental distress as a result of an injury to a third party has been limited 
to humans, there does not appear to be any reason to prevent animal 
guardians from accessing the remedy offered where the other evidentiary 
requirements are also satisfied. 
In Marshall v. Lionel Enterprises, Justice Haines discussed in obiter the 
very possibility that the cause of action is capable of expansion in terms of 
claimants: 
Close relatives will no doubt pose little problem but what 
of sweethearts, fiancés, or perhaps even close friends?...I 
can do little better than to quote the statement of Lord 
Wright in Hay or Bourhill v. Young, [1943] A.C. 92 at p. 
110:
The lawyer likes to draw fixed and definite lines and is apt 
to ask where the thing is to stop. I should reply it should 
stop where in the particular case the good sense of the 
jury of the Judge decides.
The “good sense” of the Judge or jury must of course take 
into account the knowledge of the time.88
Arguably, the companion animal context provides an example of a 
situation where “the knowledge of the time” might provide justification 
for the expansion of the cause of action to the deaths of non-humans. 
Indeed, it appears to be simply good sense and the knowledge of the time 
that permitted the judges in Somerville, Ferguson and Brown to recognize 
the unreasonableness of limiting the award of damages to market value, 
given the obvious love of the animal guardian for his or her lost companion 
animal.  
88  [1971] 25 D.L.R. (3d) 141 (Ont. H.C.) at 151.
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(ii)  Mental Distress and Breach of Contract
The plaintiffs in Newell succeeded because their contract with the 
defendant airline was capable of being classified as one for peace of mind; 
their case therefore fell into an exception to the general rule that contract 
law does not compensate for mental distress. 
In Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada 
recently reconsidered the issue of when one can recover for mental distress 
flowing from a breach of contract and held that mental distress should be 
compensable where one (not necessarily the sole or primary) purpose of 
the contract is to secure a psychological benefit, provided the degree of 
mental distress caused by the breach warrants compensation.89 Thus, the 
exception for non-commercial (or peace of mind) contracts is no longer 
relevant; the applicable principle, rather, is that “as long as the promise 
in relation to state of mind is a part of the bargain in the reasonable 
contemplation of the contracting parties, mental distress damages arising 
from its breach are recoverable.”90 
It has been pointed out that the pre-Fidler rule was based upon a number 
of assumptions, the most important being that contracts are usually to 
secure a commercial benefit and so mental distress flowing from breach 
of the contract could not be said to be reasonably foreseeable.91 However, 
as courts have now recognized that liability for breach of contract causing 
mental distress is to be determined by asking whether a psychological 
benefit was an object of the contract, animal guardians could argue that 
many of the contracts entered into with various service-providers in 
relation to their pets are precisely to secure such a psychological benefit. 
Consider, for example, the scenario where a kennel is hired to board a 
companion animal while his guardian is on vacation (as in Ferguson). The 
primary object of such a contract is, without a doubt, the psychological 
89  [2006] 271 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 3 [Fidler].
90  Ibid. at para. 48.
91  Shannon Kathleen O’Byrne, Damages for Mental Distress and Other Intangible Loss in a 
Breach of Contract Action, (2005) 28 Dal. L. J. 311 at 344.
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benefit which accrues to the animal guardian from knowing that his 
companion animal is being appropriately and safely cared for while he is 
away. If the contract were breached any resulting mental distress would be 
reasonably foreseeable and, arguably, compensable under the rule in Fidler 
provided it was significant enough to justify compensation.
This approach may also avoid the difficulties associated with proving 
the existence of a “psychological illness”, as is currently the case with 
intentional or negligent infliction of mental suffering. In Fidler, Justice 
McLachlin referred repeatedly to the “anxiety”, “distress” and “discomfort” 
experienced by the plaintiff, as opposed to a “recognizable psychological 
illness”.92 Similarly, in Newell the judge referred to mental distress as being 
equivalent to frustration, annoyance or disappointment.93 This, apparently 
more forgiving, threshold of proof may increase the likelihood of recovery 
in certain actions involving companion animals.
V.  DAMAGE AWARDS FOR LOSS OF COMPANIONSHIP
(a)  Third Party Damages for Non-Pecuniary Losses Involving the 
Wrongful Death of a Human
Although companionship played a tangential role in the award in Ferguson, 
the phrase “loss of companionship” is largely absent from the Canadian 
jurisprudence dealing with the wrongful deaths of companion animals.94 
Nonetheless, loss of companionship has also been a proposed head of 
recovery in wrongful death actions for companion animals. However, as 
was originally the case with mental distress, loss of companionship is not 
compensable at common law in the context of humans.95 
92  Fidler, supra note 89 at paras. 57-60. 
93  Newell, supra note 48.
94  Part of the reason underlying the award of damages in Ferguson was the relationship the 
plaintiffs had with the dog over the 7 years they had owned it.
95  Baker v. Bolton (1808), 170 E.R. 1033, 1 Camp. 493 (Eng. Nisi Prius).
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The position at common law was first modified in England by the 1846 
passing of Lord Campbell’s Act, which permitted plaintiffs to bring an 
action for losses suffered as a result of the death of certain classes of family 
members.96 Canadian provinces enacted comparable legislation.97 However, 
the interpretation given to these legislative enactments was that losses 
recoverable under them were only those which could be said to have a 
pecuniary nature or aspect.98  
This pecuniary interpretation did permit a child to claim for the loss of 
companionship of a parent, as it can be viewed as a pecuniary loss “for 
unpaid but economically valuable services that were previously provided 
by the deceased.”99 Thus, in St. Lawrence & Ottawa Railway v. Lett the 
husband and children of a deceased woman were entitled to damages for 
loss of companionship:
I think the term injury in the statute means substantial 
injury as opposed to mere sentimental…I am free to 
admit that the injury must not be sentimental or the 
damages a mere solatium, but must be capable of a 
pecuniary estimate; but I cannot think it must necessarily 
be a loss of so many dollars and cents capable of 
calculation. The injury must be substantial; the loss, a loss 
of a substantial pecuniary benefit, and the damages are 
not to be given to soothe the feelings of the husband or 
child, but are to be given for the substantial injury.” 100 
The loss suffered by the children was deemed compensable on the ground 
that they had lost “education in religion, morals and virtue which…can be 
imparted to the children by a mother alone.”101  
96  S.M. Waddams, The Law of Damages, loose leaf (Toronto: The Cartwright Group, 2007) 
at para. 6.10.
97  Ibid.
98  Ibid. at para. 6.20.
99 Cassels, supra note 2 at 180.
100  [1885] 11 S.C.R. 422 at p. 433 [St. Lawrence].
101  Ibid., at 436.
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Some legislatures have responded to this development of the law by 
modifying the relevant statute to expressly permit recovery for loss of 
companionship. Manitoba, for example, permits recovery of $30,000 for 
the loss of companionship for a limited class of family members of the 
deceased; this award does not require that there be evidence of harm.102  
Similarly, Nova Scotia’s Fatal Injuries Act makes express that recovery in 
a wrongful death action can be for either pecuniary or non-pecuniary 
losses.103 
However, not all provinces have modified the common law approach by 
legislative enactment. British Columbia, Newfoundland and Labrador, the 
Yukon, Nunavut and the North West Territories do not yet permit recovery 
for non-pecuniary loss.104 As a result, in these jurisdictions, recovery 
for the loss of companionship of a child is rare.105 This is illustrated by 
a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal where it was 
held that, despite his suffering, a father could not recover for the loss of 
companionship of his son.  The underlying basis for such damages under 
the relevant British Columbia Act was “the loss of the ‘services’ of the 
deceased rather than the loss of the deceased himself.”106 Thus, the situation 
in Canada remains that, absent a provincial statute providing otherwise, 
the common law limits recovery for loss of companionship to pecuniary 
losses.
102  Fatal Accident Act, R.S.M. 1987, c.F50, s. 3.1.
103  Fatal Injuries Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 163, s. 5(2).
104  The legislation pertaining to fatal accidents in British Columbia, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, the Yukon, Nunavut and the North West Territories do not yet provide recovery 
for non-pecuniary loss of companionship, guidance or care.
105  One frequently noted exception is the case of Lian v. Money, [1996] 4 W.W.R. 263 
as cited inWaddams, supra note 96 at para. 6.340. However, the award was based on 
the special services the child provided to his parents and is in this way consistent with 
the common law permitting compensation for companionship which had a pecuniary 
component. 
106  Loyie v. Erickson Estate (1994), 2000 BCSC 374, [2000] 94 B.C.L.R. (2d) 33 as cited in 
Bianco Estate v. Fromow [1998] 161 D.L.R. (4th) 765. The decision in Bianco Estate that a 
parent could not in ordinary circumstances claim recovery for the loss of companionship 
of a child has been distinguished in Zapata Estate v. Grunder, 2000 BCSC 374, [2000] 
95 A.C.W.S. (3d) 297 on the ground that the holding is limited to the context of a parent 
losing a child and is not applicable to the context of a child losing a parent.
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(b)  Third Party Damages for Non-Pecuniary Losses Associated with the 
Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal 
The way in which courts have dealt with the matter of children in 
wrongful death actions is relevant to the issue of companion animals, as 
the relationship between owner and companion animal appears to be the 
most analogous to the familial relationship between parent and child (as 
opposed to, for example, that existing between spouses). As the position 
in several of our provinces and territories remains that this loss is not 
compensable, allowing recovery in the context of companion animals 
would again lead to the irrational result that an animal guardian could 
recover where a human could not for the loss of a child at common law. 
Because loss of companionship awards have largely been created by statute, 
it seems unlikely that a court will, or even should, allow recovery under 
this head for companion animals. 
VI.  THERE ARE VALID POLICY REASONS FOR NOT 
PERMITTING RECOVERY IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 
ON THE BASIS OF LOSS OF COMPANIONSHIP OR 
MENTAL DISTRESS
 
(a)  Permitting Recovery On The Facts As Found In Brown And 
Ferguson Ignores The Policy Reasons For Which Canadian Courts 
Have Limited Recovery For Mental Distress
It has been argued that the rules prohibiting recovery for emotional 
distress and loss of companionship derived from a period of time where 
the common law was “unreasonably suspicious of, and hostile, to claims 
of emotional distress, even for humans, and while it was entirely deaf to 
claims of damages for human wrongful deaths.”107While it is true that these 
arguments originate in the human context, and the author has relied upon 
the same arguments to illustrate the problems associated with recovery 
107 Wise, supra note 4 at p. 69.
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under either of these heads, the fact remains that Canadian courts continue 
to limit claims for damages for mental distress for loss of human life.  
Adherence to precedent is not the only justification for such limitation: 
there are valid policy objectives that the courts are adverting to in limiting 
access to recovery for mental distress to narrowly defined circumstances.
Justice McEachern in Devji, explains that claims for negligent infliction of 
nervous shock present two concerns:
…I am not confident that the administration of justice is 
usually able to identify unmeritorious claims successfully. 
Fraudulent claims are sometimes uncovered but many 
claims are advanced by persons who genuinely belief they 
have suffered psychiatric injury when their real condition 
is grief or sorrow, and such claims are difficult to disprove. 
Recent experience shows it is naïve not to believe that 
an expansion of any area of liability will not produce a 
volume if not a flood of both valid and invalid claims. This 
is particularly so when the line between grief and nervous 
shock is so difficult to ascertain…108
Thus, both the possibility of a substantial increase in the volume of 
litigation proceeding through the courts and the difficulties associated with 
distinguishing between grief and mental illness form a part of the rationale 
underlying the limits the judiciary has placed upon recovery for nervous 
shock. These concerns are not lessened simply because the deceased party 
is a companion animal.  
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of a principled basis upon which courts 
could justify awarding damages for mental distress on a lower threshold 
in wrongful death suits involving animals while maintaining the existing 
standards for humans. Thus, the concern about overburdening the 
judiciary is a very real one when one considers that recovery in this context 
would necessarily widen the grounds upon which an individual could 
108  Devji, supra note 78 at para. 47.
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recover when the injury or death, giving rise to the mental distress in the 
claimant, was suffered by a human.
(b)  It Is Impossible To Appropriately Quantify The Loss When The 
Damage Award Is Compensating For Loss Of Companionship Or 
Mental Distress
In claims for either mental distress or loss of companionship appropriately 
quantifying the loss is also problematic. If a companion animal is truly 
irreplaceable to its owner, how can the judiciary possibly be expected to 
identify an appropriate sum of money to repair the wrong done?  Repairing 
the injury necessarily involves identifying an amount which “makes the 
plaintiff whole” but compensating for grief or loss of companionship 
provides no logical basis upon which the value of the lost animal can be 
determined. The awards in Ferguson, Brown, Newell and Somerville are 
all illustrative of this difficulty as the awards appear to be plucked, for the 
most part, from thin air with little effort made to justify the quantum of the 
award in relation to the injury.
VII.  A RATIONAL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF 
VALUING ANIMAL COMPANIONS IN WRONGFUL 
DEATH ACTIONS
(a)  Value to Owner as Determined by Reference to Lost Investment
 Valuing companion animals by reference to the lost investment cost to 
the owner during the lifetime of the companion animal is an appropriate 
alternative to the market value approach.109 This approach provides the 
judiciary with a method by which it could reasonably assess the value of 
109  Byszewski, supra note 4 at 233. The author of this article identified the first use of this 
theory of recovery in an American case valuing the life of a child in a wrongful death 
action and argued that this could be the germ of a rational theory of recovery in the 
context of companion animal wrongful death actions. 
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the companion animal, while not disrupting other established common 
law principles. Moreover, such an approach is consistent with the flexibility 
Canadian courts have occasionally demonstrated when valuing unique 
forms of property.
Loss of investment takes into account expenditures made by the animal 
guardian in caring and providing for the companion animal. Costs such as 
immunizations, neutering, training and food would be calculated to arrive 
at a number which more accurately reflects the value of the companion 
animal to the guardian. If actual data are not available, a court could rely 
upon average expenditures to calculate the investment loss. Thus, based 
on the Ipsos-Reid data referred to above, if the companion animal at the 
centre of the wrongful death action were a dog, the figure of $650 would 
be multiplied by the number of years the dog lived to arrive at an amount 
reflective of his value.   
Allowing recovery for investment to date of death has several benefits. 
Firstly, it is reasonably capable of an accurate assessment, either by 
reference to statistics which indicate average annual expenditures for 
maintaining a companion animal or to documented expenditures made 
by the owner. Valuing animals in this way also lessens fears of lawsuits 
for extraordinary sums being initiated whenever a companion animal 
is wrongfully killed. By recognizing the bond between guardian and 
companion animal, and viewing the companion animal as an investment, 
courts would not be constrained by the classification of companion 
animals as property. 
The suggestion that the investment approach should be extended to cover 
the entire life the companion animal would have lived, absent the tortious 
act which led to its death, possibly goes too far.110 The compensation for 
110  Ibid.  at 239. The author goes further, however, than simply investment to date of 
death and suggests that the recovery should be based upon  investment to date of death 
plus the annual estimated investment multiplied by the number of years the companion 
animal could reasonably have been expected to live beyond its wrongful death date. In the 
author’s opinion this figure would reflect the “minimum amount that courts should equate 
with entire pecuniary loss, including loss of companionship.” 
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the years beyond which the companion animal lived are proposed on the 
basis that the investment cost only to the date of death fails to account for 
loss of companionship.111 However, as discussed above, Canadian courts 
are resolute that non-pecuniary loss of companionship is not compensable. 
Allowing recovery for what would have been the rest of the animal’s natural 
life may be inconsistent with the approach taken to “companionship” losses 
at common law.   
(b)  Legislative Action as the Preferable Means of Altering the Law
As this brief paper has tried to demonstrate, the difficulties associated 
with recovery under the existing common law are fairly wide-ranging, 
and transcend simply the legal classification of animals as chattels. Of any 
possible solution to the problem of more appropriately valuing companion 
animals, carefully considered statutory change is perhaps the most 
attractive as well as the most viable. However, any legislative instrument 
addressing the problem would benefit from a consideration of the loss 
of investment approach to arrive at numbers which link compensation 
amounts to the value to guardian. 
Legislative enactment would remove any uncertainty as to who has an 
action following the death of a companion animal, as well as the types of 
animals for which damages ought to be recoverable. It would also do away 
with the current limitations imposed by the common law, thereby relieving 
the judiciary of the difficulty of formulating an appropriate and workable 
theory of recovery. In the United States, where individuals and courts have 
also struggled with the concepts of property, nervous shock, and the effect 
of Lord Campbell’s Act, the legislature is increasingly being identified as the 
more appropriate governmental branch to modify the law as it stands in 
relation to companion animals.112  Some progress has been made, as two 
111  Ibid. 
112  Both academics and judges have commented that the legislature should step in and 
modify the common law if changes are to be effected. In Byszewski, supra note 4 at 224, 
the author cites Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795 (Wis. 2001), where it was 
observed at 807 that legislative change is preferable as it “allows the legislature to make 
a considered policy judgment regarding the societal value of pets as companions and to 
specify the nature of the damages to be awarded in a lawsuit.” 
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States have enacted legislation to allow recovery of non-economic damages 
in limited circumstances.  An examination of these instruments could 
provide Canadian legislators and animal rights advocates with insight into 
resolving the difficulties associated with the present state of the law.113
CONCLUSION
It has been said that denying recovery in excess of market value when 
a companion animal is wrongfully killed effectively “belittles the 
relationship and affection between animal and human, and reinforces 
the misconception that reasonable people are not emotionally harmed 
by the death of a companion animal.”114 While this is powerful 
rhetoric, it ignores the very real difficulties and complexities currently 
associated with recovery at common law. Canadian courts have not 
been intentionally belittling the role companion animals play in the 
daily lives of Canadians; they have, for the most part acknowledged the 
relationship that can and does exist between a pet and his guardian, but 
have struggled to discover an alternative and logical method of valuation 
to replace market value. 
The loss of investment approach sidesteps the current challenges to recovery 
posed by the common law.  It provides the judiciary with a model that 
responds to the high value Canadian society places on our relationships with 
companion animals, as well as to concerns that such a change would either 
substantially increase the volume of litigation in Canadian courts or result 
in inflated claims.  Statutory change, in addition to a common law right of 
action, would also more closely align the law with the social values held 
by Canadians today. Together, these two changes are capable of effectively 
responding to the shortcomings of the present approach. 
113  Tennessee and Illinois have legislation in place: Tenn. Code Ann. §44-17-403 (2000); 
Humane Care for Animals Act IL ST CH 510 §70/1.
114  Squires-Lee, supra note 4 at 1083
